France has been a demographic exception in Europe for many years, because of its fairly prime start charge. Alternatively, this singularity is disappearing as of late because of the transformations of existence trajectories, territories and representations of the longer term. A silent overcomposition takes form in the back of the born figures. What does it let us know about recent French society?
Firstly of 2026, INSEE has simply printed an estimate that has been picked up by way of all the press: France will enjoy 645,000 births for 651,000 deaths in 2025. This example isn’t a marvel, however finds a dynamic that has been occurring for greater than a decade.
France has lengthy been an exception in Europe. As an example, Germany has had a herbal deficit since 1970, and Italy since 1990.
With 1.56 youngsters in keeping with lady in 2025, France continues to be extra fertile than the Eu Union reasonable (1.38 youngsters in keeping with lady in 2023). However this degree is the bottom the rustic has noticed for the reason that First International Conflict.
Structural trade in demographic dynamics
Those measurements are given by way of the Overall Fertility Indicator (TCI) which estimates the selection of youngsters that ladies would have on reasonable if they’d the age-specific fertility charges measured in a given 12 months all over their childbearing lives (for instance, we upload the fertility of ladies in every age crew, 15 to 49, within the overall fertility charge in 2025.25 to get the overall fertility rate20).
The good thing about this indicator is that it may be calculated in actual time. The drawback is that it does no longer take note the fertility calendar. If a technology of ladies later has youngsters, there will probably be a decline in TFR, whilst their finished fertility (FD) won’t essentially lower.
Ultimate fertility (FD) is an statement: we have a look at the tip in their fertile existence, what number of youngsters a technology of ladies in fact had. It’s due to this fact a real dimension, unaffected by way of the fertility calendar, however we need to look ahead to a technology of ladies to achieve 50 to calculate it.
The ICF is due to this fact matter to larger annual variation than the DF. Thus, the TFR has numerous since 1980 when it used to be 1.94 youngsters in keeping with lady. We seen the decline section till 1995 with at least 1.73, then enlargement till 2010 once we reached 2.03. From 2014, an excessively speedy decline starts, achieving 1.56 in 2025.
FD used to be fairly solid: it numerous between 2 and a couple of.1 youngsters in keeping with lady for the 1960, 1970 or 1980 generations. It’s too early to calculate the FD for the 1990 technology, however it’s more likely to be decrease.
Youngsters all later
French ladies are having youngsters later and later. This construction started within the overdue Nineteen Sixties. The common age of moms in motherhood additional reduced to 29.6 years in 2005, then to 31.2 years in 2025.
The truth that they’re having youngsters later and later, related to a decline in ladies’s fertility after age 30, additionally impacts FD. Thus, 87% of ladies from the technology of 1930 (child growth moms) had a minimum of one kid. This determine drops to 80% for the 1970 technology and approaches 75% for the ones from the Nineteen Eighties.
The New Geography of Fertility
During the twentieth century, the determinants of fertility have been social and have been represented by way of a U-shaped curve. Probably the most fertile French ladies have been the ones from the wealthiest and maximum modest socio-professional classes. The least fertile French ladies come from the center social strata (hired and heart professions).
Fertility in France (2006-2019)
Fertility in France (2006-2019). Equipped by way of the creator
The “fertile crescent” within the north is characterised by way of traditionally upper fertility than that within the south, which continues to be noticeable in 2010. This particularity used to be a end result of the social and cultural construction of the inhabitants: basically from the people and dealing elegance, extra strongly marked by way of Catholicism and conventional values, within the north, which used to be extremely industrialized on the time.
However during the last fifteen years, the Fertile Crescent has tended to vanish, with fertility declining right through the territory. Best wallet of upper relative fertility are nonetheless provide, at the one hand, in jap Brittany and within the Pais de l. a. Loire, the place extra conventional circle of relatives norms persist, and, however, within the outer edge of Ile de France and the Rhône valley, spaces marked by way of a more potent presence of the operating elegance.
Sure areas with historically prime start charges, such because the North, Pas de Calais and Lorraine, have noticed a vital decline in massive households and still have fertility charges similar to the nationwide reasonable. This might be defined by way of the decline of conventional circle of relatives values, however above all by way of business decline and financial uncertainty (unemployment, lack of confidence), which can be documented components within the decline of fertility within the final fifteen years (in France and somewhere else in Europe).
In the end, the growing older of moms in maternity wards is standard, despite the fact that it’s extra pronounced within the south of France and within the capitals.
The need to have youngsters decreases
The need for a kid refers to 2 other ideas. The specified selection of youngsters is the solution to the query of what number of youngsters other folks need to have. Ladies historically categorical a reasonably larger need for kids than males. The discovered need for kids is complementary (that is FD).
When they’re when put next, the specified selection of youngsters is all the time more than the discovered need for kids, as a result of some ladies have fewer youngsters than desired for quite a lot of causes: infertility, dating breakdown, financial difficulties. Those constraints (financial, social, organic) restrict the power of people to understand their reproductive intentions and give a contribution to the relief of fertility.
The need for a kid modified the size. As of late, solid {couples} normally need to have one or two youngsters. Twenty-five years in the past it used to be extra like two or 3. Refusal to have youngsters has higher, however continues to be marginal, from 5 to twelve%.
Some hypotheses
This decline within the need to have youngsters is new in France and we will provide some hypotheses that in combination affect the will to have youngsters and their realization, along with demographic components.
To start with, if the rise within the degree of schooling and the rise within the reliable process of ladies strongly contributed to the decline in fertility on the finish of the twentieth century, this impact turns out to had been in large part exhausted as of late. The massification of upper schooling and the everlasting entrenchment of ladies’s paintings now represent a stabilized framework, which not lets in, on its own, to provide an explanation for the hot decline in fertility.
The principle reason why appears to be concern of the longer term. A troublesome financial context is related to a decline within the start charge, as research in Europe have proven, for instance with the 2008 disaster. In all surveys, younger adults categorical fear about local weather trade, the geopolitical context, and financial and social uncertainty. The local weather disaster most definitely performs a job, however on the margin. Additionally, the rejection of kids continues to be within the minority. In additional element, it’s quite the habits of younger other folks from large towns, with upper schooling, for whom no longer having youngsters could be an “ecological” gesture.
If the evolution of circle of relatives illustration and normative adjustments give a contribution to this motion of lowered fertility amongst younger ladies, we might also see higher difficulties find a stability between circle of relatives and paintings within the context of task lack of confidence. Certainly, employment and its stipulations most probably play a job. If unemployment in France has fallen during the last ten years, the character of jobs has modified. The primary solid task steadily comes after a number of unsure contracts, so later.
The condo additionally performs a job. France does no longer be offering sufficient housing in the case of the expansion within the selection of families. This ends up in a pointy build up in condo and buy costs, in addition to a loss of to be had housing, particularly in massive towns. Many younger execs nonetheless are living of their folks’ family or in shared lodging.
What long run for fertility in France?
Those components may widen the distance between the best and precise selection of youngsters. We will assume that the discussed dangers are actually perceived as long-term boundaries for more youthful generations. As soon as internalized, they’re now robust sufficient to modify the norms and concepts concerning the circle of relatives, which impact the very need to have a kid.
France is most definitely at a demographic turning level, which started ten years in the past: the herbal build up has change into a deficit. The declining need to have youngsters some of the more youthful generations obviously tells us that that is more likely to be an enduring pattern.
Via the tip of the last decade, we will be expecting a complete fertility charge most definitely underneath 1.7. Alternatively, it must no longer fall underneath 1.3, as the will for kids continues to be provide. Because of this a herbal deficit is more likely to happen over the years. On this sense, France has change into a Eu nation like every other as a result of that is the case in nearly all international locations of the Eu Union.
