The brand new Syrian executive has signed a take care of to combine the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) military into the regime, in what is a huge step in opposition to uniting the fractured nation.
The Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-led (HTS) executive has been suffering for legitimacy because it ousted Bashar al-Assad overdue ultimate yr, following greater than a decade of civil conflict in a rustic riddled with sectarian divisions. The deal recognises the Kurdish minority as “an integral part of the Syrian state” and promises “the rights of all Syrians to representation and participation in the political process”.
It’s a well timed construction for the intervening time chief, Ahmed al-Sharaa. The deal follows days of violence within the coastal area of Latakia within the west of the rustic by which greater than 1,000 folks – principally civilians – had been killed.
The ostensible spark was once a central authority raid to arrest former regime officers who had long gone to floor within the area. However there was once not anything spontaneous about what took place subsequent. In synchronised assaults, squads of Assad regime remnants ambushed and killed ratings of presidency safety forces.
Snipers then pinned down reinforcements and fired on ambulances. Including to the fog of conflict, hundreds of armed Sunni civilians streamed into Latakia to stop a coup in opposition to the brand new executive.
The protection forces have regained regulate, however at a horrible price. In scenes that resembled the worst moments of Syria’s civil conflict, loads of civilians had been killed. A rally to protect a unfastened Syria had descended into requires vengeance and resulted in a surprising, sectarian bloodbath. However for any person looking at, the entire caution indicators were appearing for a while.
A tenuous peace holds in post-Assad Syria.
Institute for the Learn about of Struggle
Mounting stress
The primary indication of establishing stress was once that different anti-Assad revolt teams had been starting to lose persistence with the brand new executive, specifically after al-Sharaa introduced in December 2024 that the entire militias can be dissolved and built-in into the HTS-controlled defence ministry. This was once flatly rejected by means of some factions. Others counseled it, however intentionally obstructed efforts to transport ahead with al-Sharaa’s plans for the mixing procedure.
Those occasions at once induced the massacres of early March. HTS is a rather small revolt team. It was once briefly crushed by means of the hot rebellion. The federal government needed to depend on different militias – the exact same ones it had failed to position below its regulate.
The end result was once chaos. There is not any proof that al-Sharaa ordered the massacres, however he may no longer save you them. The worst violations seem to have been performed by means of overseas Jihadists and the Syrian Nationwide Military, a coalition of Turkish proxy militias.
It’s in doubt that al-Sharaa can punish the ones accountable, for the reason that he’s reliant on Turkish patronage to stick in energy. The rebellion and the massacres have handiest bolstered this dynamic.
The brand new executive additionally did not delineate a clear framework for transitional justice. Their reluctance to take action is comprehensible. After over a decade of brutal civil conflict, there are few blameless events in Syria as of late. It was once no longer handiest the Assad regime but additionally HTS and plenty of different revolt teams that dedicated conflict crimes.
Similarly, Syria’s minorities – specifically Alawites, an offshoot of Shia Islam that accommodates round 10% of Syria’s inhabitants – had been over-represented within the Assad regime’s best echelons. Maximum revolt teams had been Sunni ruled. Any public try to settle ratings, then, may alienate Syria’s minorities.
Fragile coalition: the brand new regime led by means of Ahmad al-Sharaa is suffering to unite Syria after yhears of civil conflict.
EPA-EFE/Mohammed al-Rifai
This means backfired in two tactics. First, the brand new executive’s safety forces performed secretive operations to root out high-profile regime remnants. Because the sought after folks had been incessantly Alawites, it was once those communities that felt disproportionately focused.
This, in flip, exacerbated the Alawite group’s fears and insecurities. Certainly, it was once the sort of safety sweeps that preceded the hot violence.
2nd, with out a clear means of duty and justice, many Syrians took the regulation into their very own fingers. Those “revenge killings” had been most commonly performed by means of Sunnis in opposition to Alawites.
In consequence, Alawites felt that they might no longer depend at the executive to offer protection to them and plenty of refused handy of their guns. Those 3 developments – the Alawite group’s greater alienation, the failure of a lot of its participants to disarm and the Sunni-led extrajudicial killings – all culminated within the contemporary violence.
Sour insurgency
However the insurgency didn’t emerge in a single day. In December 2024, a bunch calling itself the Syrian Well-liked Resistance declared conflict in opposition to the federal government.
In the similar month, a senior Iranian basic advocated that Tehran use its “networks” to “form resistance cells” in Syria. This was once no longer simply bluster. No longer handiest was once there a gradual build up in assaults in opposition to safety forces in early 2025, however Iran additionally endured to make use of Syria as a conduit to provide guns to Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
Participants of those longstanding networks had not anything to realize from turning themselves in. Many dedicated conflict crimes for Assad and had been sought after males. However in addition they had monetary motivations. Those networks had been a very powerful conduits for smuggling captagon, an amphetamine-like drug.
Beneath Assad, Syria manufactured upwards of 80% of the arena’s captagon provide. Greater call for for the drug, in flip, stored the sanctions-hit regime afloat.
Assad can have fled to Moscow, however the smuggling networks stayed put, as did captagon’s buyer base. Syria’s new executive fought in opposition to the captagon business and guns smuggling alike. This was once a noble intention, but it additionally made some type of armed resistance inevitable.
Somewhere else within the nation, the SDF’s choice to put down its hands is a big step forward, for the reason that oil-rich japanese Syria has functioned as a de facto unbiased state for the reason that Syrian civil conflict broke out in 2011.
However the dynamics that provoked the March massacres have no longer long gone away. The SDF deal provides the HTS-led executive a possibility to concentrate on addressing the grievances of the Alawite group and on offering a clear framework for justice and reconciliation, whilst appearing forcefully in opposition to pro-Assad remnants.
It is a tough balancing act, however this is a important one. Syria stays a rustic with too many weapons and no longer sufficient funding, duty and excellent governance.
