Whilst the air and floor conflict in Ukraine grinds on, Moscow is expanding force on Kyiv’s western allies. Russian drone incursions into Poland within the early hours of September 10, and Romania a couple of days later, had been adopted by way of 3 Russian fighter jets breaching Estonian airspace on September 19.
And there was hypothesis that drones which pressured the transient closure of Copenhagen and Oslo airports in a single day are hooked up to the Kremlin as smartly.
Whilst this may recommend a planned process of escalation at the a part of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, it’s much more likely an try to hide the truth that the Kremlin’s narrative of inevitable victory is starting to glance shakier than ever.
A failed summer season offensive that has been extraordinarily expensive in human lives is hardly ever one thing to cheer about. Estimates of Russian fight deaths now stand at just below 220,000. What’s extra, this lack of lifestyles has produced little in territorial advances.
Because the get started of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia has won some 70,000 sq km. Which means that Moscow has just about tripled the quantity of territory it illegally occupies. However all the way through its most up-to-date summer season offensive, it won fewer than 2,000 sq km. On September 1, 2022, Russia managed simply over 20% of Ukrainian territory, 3 years later it was once 19% (up from 18.5% firstly of 2025).
Most likely maximum telling that the Russian narrative of inevitable victory is hole is the truth that Russian forces had been not able to transform a meant step forward round Pokrovsk within the Donbas space of Ukraine in August into any forged features after a a success Ukrainian counterattack.
That Russia isn’t profitable, on the other hand, is hardly ever of convenience to Ukraine. Moscow nonetheless has the power to assault evening after evening, exposing weaknesses in Ukraine’s air defence machine and focused on vital infrastructure.
The western reaction, too, has been gradual up to now and has but to ship a transparent sign to the Kremlin what Nato’s and the EU’s pink traces are. Whilst Nato unexpectedly introduced Jap Sentry based on the Russian drone incursion into Poland, the operation’s deterrent impact seems fairly restricted given next Russian incursions into Estonia and undeclared flights in impartial airspace close to Poland and Germany.
The standing of the conflict in Ukraine, September 22, 2025.
ISW
Next feedback by way of Donald Tusk, the Polish top minister, threatened to “shoot down flying objects when they violate our territory and fly over Poland”. He additionally cautioned that it was once necessary “to think twice before deciding on actions that could trigger a very acute phase of conflict.”
At the different aspect of the Atlantic, Donald Trump, the United States president, has mentioned little about Russia ratcheting up force on Nato’s japanese flank. In regards to the Russian drone incursion into Poland, he mused that it would were a mistake, earlier than pledging to shield Nato allies within the tournament of a Russian assault.
That is unquestionably an development on his previous threats to Nato unity, however it’s at very best a backstop towards a full-blown Russian escalation. What it’s not is a decisive step to finishing the conflict towards Ukraine. In reality, this type of US steps appear ever farther off the schedule. The closing date that Trump gave Putin after their Alaska summit to start out direct peace talks with Ukraine got here and went with out the rest going down.
Europe scrambles to switch US promises
As for Trump’s phase-two sanctions on Russia and its enablers, those have now been made conditional by way of Trump on all Nato and G7 international locations, enforcing such sanctions first.
Poland’s top minister, Donald Tusk, chairs an emergency assembly in Warsaw after Russian drones violated Polish airspace.
UPI/Alamy Are living Information
In the meantime, US palms gross sales to Europe, intended to be channelled to improve Ukraine’s defences, were scaled down by way of the Pentagon to refill its personal arsenals.
On the similar time, a longstanding US fortify programme for the Baltic states – the Baltic safety initiative – is below risk from cuts. There are justified worries that it might be discontinued as of subsequent yr.
As has been transparent for a while, fortify for Ukraine – and in the long run the defence of Europe – is not a number one worry for the United States below Trump. But Ecu efforts to step into the gaping hollow within the continent’s safety left by way of US retrenchment are painfully gradual. The defence budgets of the EU’s 5 largest army spenders – France, Germany, Poland, Italy and the Netherlands – blended are lower than one-quarter of what the United States spends yearly.
Even supposing cash weren’t the problem, Europe has critical issues of its defence-industrial base. The EU’s flagship Safety Motion for Europe programme has confronted months of delays over the participation of non-EU individuals – together with the United Kingdom and Canada, two international locations that have vital defence-industrial capability.
Ecu defence cooperation, together with the flagship Long run Fight Air Device, is threatened by way of nationwide quarrels, together with between the EU’s two greatest defence avid gamers, France and Germany.
To this point, muddling via has labored for Ukraine’s western allies. That is most commonly as a result of Kyiv has held the road towards the Russian onslaught. It has finished so by way of making do with regardless of the west equipped whilst impulsively innovating its personal defence sector.
It has additionally labored as a result of Trump has now not (but) totally deserted his Ecu allies. There may be sufficient lifestyles – or most likely simply sufficient ambiguity – left within the thought of Nato as a collective defence alliance to present Putin pause for concept. For now, he’s simply checking out barriers. But when unchallenged, he may stay pushing additional into uncharted territory – with unpredictable penalties.
Western stop-gap measures is also advantageous for now. However the west’s responses to Putin’s demanding situations – that are more likely to change into extra common and extra serious one day – would require the Ecu coalition of the keen to concentrate on the right here and now and lift its stage of preparedness.
