The oil-rich states of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have so much going for them: wealth, home steadiness and rising world affect. In fresh months, those Gulf kingdoms additionally seem nearer to one thing they’ve lengthy sought: dependable U.S. beef up that has develop into more potent and extra uncritical than ever, simply as Iranian energy within the area has considerably degraded.
In Donald Trump, the nonelected Gulf Arab monarchs have an best friend in Washington who has in large part shed earlier American issues for democracy and human rights. That the American president made his first scheduled global go back and forth of his 2nd time period to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE most effective underscores their global clout.
Moreover, the preferred overthrow of the Assad govt in Syria and Israel’s warfare in opposition to Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Yemen have served to a great deal weaken Tehran’s perceived risk to Gulf Arab pursuits.
But, as a professional on Heart Jap politics, I imagine Gulf Arab international locations should nonetheless navigate a regional political tightrope. And because the Israeli focused on of senior Hamas leaders in Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, displays, occasions via different Heart Jap actors have an uncongenial dependancy of derailing Gulf leaders’ plans.
How those international locations organize 4 explicit uncertainties could have a vital impact on their hopes for steadiness and enlargement.
1. Managing a post-civil warfare Syria
In Syria, years of civil warfare that had exacerbated splits amongst ethnic and non secular teams in spite of everything led to December 2024. Since then, Arab Gulf international locations, which as soon as adversarial the Iranian-allied govt of Bashar Assad, had been pivotal in supporting new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. They effectively lobbied the U.S. to drop sanctions.
Along with sharing mutual regional pursuits with Sharaa, the leaders of Gulf Arab states desire a Syrian state this is unfastened from inside warfare and will soak up the thousands and thousands of refugees that fled the warfare to different international locations within the Heart East.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman greets Syria’s intervening time President Ahmed al-Sharaa in February 2025.
Saudi Ministry of Media by the use of AP
Gulf states can beef up postwar Syria diplomatically and financially. Then again, they may be able to’t want away the legacy of lengthy warfare and sectarian strife. Israeli assaults on Syrian soil since Assad’s fall, in addition to fresh outbreaks of preventing within the Sweida area of southern Syria, underscore the continuing fragility of the Syrian govt and issues over its talent to include violence and migration outdoor of its borders.
2. The problem of regional politics
Syria illustrates a broader coverage problem for Gulf states. As their wealth, army power and affect have grown, those international locations have develop into dominant within the Arab international.
In consequence, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested billions of bucks in efforts to steer governments and teams the world over. This contains the most commonly authoritarian governments within the Heart East and North Africa, corresponding to Egypt’s.
However right here, Gulf states are torn politically. If democratic techniques shape somewhere else within the Arab international, this would inspire Gulf electorate to push for elected govt at house. But overly coercive Arab governments outdoor of the Gulf can also be at risk of widespread unrest or even civil warfare.
Propping up unpopular regional governments dangers backfiring on Gulf Arab leaders in one in all two techniques.
First, it could possibly lure Gulf states into protracted and destructive wars, corresponding to used to be the case with Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s failed army intervention in Yemen in opposition to the Houthis. 2d, it could possibly power a wedge between Gulf states, as is observed with the present warfare in Sudan, through which the Saudis and Emiratis are backing rival factions.
3. Observing which means Iran will flip
All the time looming at the back of difficult Heart Jap politics is Iran, the traditionally tough, populous, non-Arab nation whose governing Shiite Islam ideology has been the executive antagonist to the Sunni-led Gulf Arab states because the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Opposing Gulf Arab and American strategic pursuits, Iran has for years intervened aggressively in Heart Jap politics via investment and inspiring militant Shiite teams in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and somewhere else.
An assertive Iran has been particularly a thorn within the facet of Saudi Arabia, which strives to be the dominant Muslim majority energy within the area. Coping with Iran has required cautious balancing from Qatar and the UAE, that are extra at once uncovered to Tehran geographically and feature maintained reasonably more potent members of the family.
Given this, Gulf international locations would possibly silently welcome the lower in Iran’s army energy within the wake of Israel’s fresh warfare in opposition to Iran and its allies, corresponding to Hezbollah in Lebanon, whilst additionally fearing additional Iranian-Israeli warfare.
On the identical time, a much less tough Iran runs two varieties of new attainable risks for Gulf states. Will have to Iran develop into extra risky, the ensuing turmoil may well be felt around the area.
As well as, will have to Iran’s army, coverage and financial turmoil result in a brand new political gadget, it would disturb Gulf international locations. Neither a Muslim majority democratic govt nor a extra hard-line nationalist variant in Iran would sit down smartly with within sight Gulf monarchs.
Conversely, issues that the Israeli and U.S. bombing of Iran would possibly if truth be told result in greater Iranian choice to pursue a nuclear program additionally fear Gulf leaders.
4. Residing with Israel’s army assertiveness
Israel, the unquestioned army energy and sole nuclear guns state within the area, has lengthy posed in particular deep political dilemmas to Gulf Arab states. The present problem is methods to steadiness the immense world unpopularity of the Israeli govt’s warfare in Gaza – together with amongst Gulf Arab electorate – with commonplace strategic pursuits the Gulf states dangle with Israel.
Gulf Arab leaders face home and regional power to turn team spirit for Palestinians and their aspirations for statehood.
But Gulf rulers additionally proportion strategic objectives with Israel. In conjunction with opposition to Iranian affect, Gulf states handle robust army hyperlinks to the U.S, like Israel. In addition they admire the industrial and different safety worth of Israel’s high-tech merchandise, together with device used for espionage and cybersecurity.
This is helping give an explanation for the UAE’s 2019 resolution to enroll in the fast checklist of Arab states with complete diplomatic members of the family with Israel. Hamas attacked Israel in 2023 partially to prevent Saudi Arabia from following swimsuit – one thing that would possibly have additional sidelined Palestinians’ bargaining energy.
Certainly, strikes towards open Saudi diplomatic reputation of Israel have been stopped via Hamas’ assault and the worldwide backlash that adopted Israel’s ongoing devastation of Gaza.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, proper, welcomes President Donald Trump for the crowd picture with Gulf Cooperation Council leaders right through the GCC Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on Might 14, 2025.
AP Picture/Alex Brandon
Gulf leaders would possibly nonetheless imagine that normalized ties with Israel can be excellent for the long-term financial possibilities of the area. And Bahrain and the UAE – the 2 Gulf Arab states with diplomatic members of the family with Israel – have now not sponsored clear of their reputable dating.
But increasing open members of the family with Israel additional, and taking in different Gulf states, is not likely with no actual reversal in Israel’s coverage towards Palestinians in each Gaza and the West Financial institution.
All that is truer within the quick aftermath of Israel’s assault in Qatar – the primary time Israel has introduced an immediate strike inside of a Gulf Arab state. That motion, even supposing ostensibly directed at Hamas, is more likely to exacerbate tensions now not most effective with Qatar however position expanding rigidity at the calculus allied Gulf Arab international locations make of their dealings with Israel.
Difficult future of Gulf Arab states
Those demanding situations underscore an inescapable reality for Gulf leaders: They’re hostage to occasions past their keep an eye on.
Insulating them from that fact takes regional solidarity.
The Gulf Cooperation Council, just about 45 years previous, used to be established exactly for this function. Whilst it stays probably the most a hit regional group within the Heart East, the GCC has now not all the time averted main rifts, corresponding to in 2017 when a coalition of Arab states led via Saudi Arabia reduce ties with and blockaded Qatar.
The warfare used to be resolved in 2021. Since then, the six individuals of the GCC have labored in combination extra carefully.
Unquestionably, rivalries and disagreements nonetheless exist. But Arab Gulf leaders have realized that cooperation comes in handy within the face of main demanding situations. This can also be observed within the fresh collaborative diplomatic approaches towards Syria and the U.S.
A 2nd lesson comes from the wider Heart East. Key problems are ceaselessly interdependent, in particular the standing of Palestinians. Hamas’ assault on Israel, and the ensuing destruction of a lot of Gaza, resurfaced the deep recognition around the area of addressing Palestinian wishes and rights.
The monarchs of the Arab Gulf want to handle their unchallenged home political standing whilst increasing their affect within the Heart East and past. Then again, even if Gulf leaders need to be executed with the area’s demanding situations, the ones demanding situations don’t seem to be all the time executed with them.
Isabella Ishanyan, a UMass Amherst undergraduate, equipped analysis help for this text.
